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I. Introduction
In 1972, Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas sug-
gested: "Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's
ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing
upon environmental objects to sue for their own preserva-
tion."2 Needless to say, twenty-five years have passed and
environmental objects are still refused standing on their own.
Instead, the doctrine of standing has become stricter, espe-
cially when encountered by environmental organizations.
3
This trend toward stricter standing is especially evident in
light of the recent decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in Florida Audubon Society
v. Bentsen (Bentsen II). 4 The Bentsen II decision made it "vir-
tually impossible" 5 for environmentalists to bring a proce-
dural rights challenge under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).6
Standing is a doctrine which exists to ensure the proper
parties are before the court.7 There are three elements which
a party bringing an action must demonstrate to pass the test
of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.8
2. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). See generally Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-To-
ward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
3. See Patti A. Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental
Law Standing, 8:2 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 343 (1993).
4. 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
5. Id. at 675 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Judge Rogers limited this assertion
to cases involving agency rulemaking that has a "diffuse impact." Id.
6. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370d (1994).
7. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
8. See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text for an explanation of these
elements. The standing doctrine also contains prudential limitations, which
are "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). These include:
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/11
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Plaintiffs bring a procedural rights or procedural injury case
when they claim the federal government has harmed an in-
terest of the plaintiffs by violating a procedure required
under a federal statute.9 Significantly lower standards are
required of procedural rights plaintiffs to meet the test of
standing.10
Bentsen If is a procedural rights case.1" The plaintiffs,
an individual and three environmental organizations,1 2 chal-
lenged the Secretary of the Treasury's failure to follow a pro-
cedure required by NEPA.13 The Bentsen I court held that
the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue because they failed
to demonstrate injury in fact and causation.' 4 In footnote
four of the opinion, the court adopted a new requirement of
procedural rights standing that forces "litigant[s] . . . to es-
tablish the nature and likelihood of the environmental injury
that it is the purpose of an environmental impact statement
to identify."15 Thus, the Bentsen II decision has placed an un-
due burden on procedural rights plaintiffs.
To fully understand the impact of the Bentsen II decision,
one must be familiar with the development of the doctrine of
standing, the special treatment of procedural rights cases
within that doctrine, and the reasoning of the Bentsen II
the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal
rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the re-
quirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of inter-
ests protected by the law invoked.
Id. Indeed, the issue of standing may be decided on prudential grounds without
ever reaching the constitutional requirements. See Hazardous Waste Treat-
ment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 921 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
9. See, e.g., Christopher T. Burt, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 279 (1995); Brian J. Gatchel,
Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 11
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75 (1995); Patti A. Meeks, Justice Scalia and the De-
mise of Environmental Law Standing, 8:2 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 343 (1993).
10. See infra Parts II.C.1-2.
11. See generally Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
12. The plaintiffs included Diane Jensen, the Florida Audubon Society, the
Florida Wildlife Federation, and Friends of the Earth. See Florida Audubon
Society v. Bentsen (Bentsen 1), 54 F.3d 873, 875 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
13. See infra Part II.B. for an analysis of NEPA.
14. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 672.
15. Id. (Buckley, J., concurring).
3
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court. Therefore, Part II of this Case Note provides back-
ground information on standing in general and on procedural
rights standing under NEPA. Part II focuses on the injury in
fact requirement as applied to procedural rights cases, be-
cause it is primarily within this area of standing that the
Bentsen II court improperly applied Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife (Lujan).16 Part III discusses the facts, procedural
history, and reasoning in Bentsen I. Part IV contains a legal
analysis of the court's opinion. Finally, Part V concludes that
the Bentsen II court misapplied the Supreme Court decision
in Lujan, and should have retained the circuit's prior stand-
ing test for procedural rights plaintiffs. Thus, this Case Note
does not consider the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, nor
whether the plaintiffs demonstrated standing. Rather, this
Case Note focuses on the Bentsen II court's application and
interpretation of the standing doctrine as it applies to causes
of action based on NEPA.
II. Background
A. Traditional Standing Requirements
The modern doctrine of standing has emerged from the
statement in Article III of the Constitution 17 that the "judi-
cial Power shall extend to all Cases... [and] ... Controver-
sies."' 8 The Supreme Court rarely discussed standing in
Article III terms prior to 1965.19 In 1968, the Court analyzed
taxpayer standing in Flast v. Cohen.20 There, the Court de-
16. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Lujan is a leading Supreme Court decision con-
cerning the standing of environmental plaintiffs. See David Sive, Environmen-
tal Standing, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 49 (1995). David Sive is Professor of
Law at Pace University School of Law and serves as a Faculty Advisor to the
Pace Environmental Law Review.
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
'Injuries,' and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170-71 (1992) [hereinafter
Sunstein].
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
19. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 169. Professor Sunstein points out that
only eight out of 117 Supreme Court discussions on standing in Article III
terms occurred prior to 1965, and that no court referred to the phrase "injury in
fact" before Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See Sunstein, supra note 17,
at 169.
20. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/11
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clared: "the question is whether the person whose standing is
challenged is a proper party to request adjudication of a par-
ticular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable."21
Thereafter, the number of standing cases in the Supreme
Court steadily increased every few years.22 The doctrine was
somewhat unclear, and Justice Douglas stated that
"[gleneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless
as such."23 Finally, however, in Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc.,24 the Supreme Court outlined a three-part test for
standing:
at an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who
invokes the court's authority to show that he [1] personally
has suffered some actual or threatened injury [2] as a re-
sult of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant...
and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged
action and [3] is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. 25
The requirement of showing an actual or threatened in-
jury has been explained in more detail by the Court in subse-
quent decisions. First, the "party seeking review must be
himself among the injured."26 Second, the injury suffered by
21. Id. at 99-100.
22. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 169.
23. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970).
24. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
25. Id. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gladstone Real-
tors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)). See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984). In Allen, the court applied this three-part test to the plaintiffs'
claim that an IRS grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools
caused "their children's diminished ability to receive an education in a racially
integrated school." Id. at 756. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
meet the redressability requirement because they could not show that a judg-
ment in their favor would redress their children's injuries. Id. at 758. The
court also concluded that this claim did not pass the test of standing because
the injury was not fairly traceable to the IRS action, calling the line of causa-
tion "attenuated at best." Id. at 757.
26. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
19971 377
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the party must be "distinct and palpable."27 If the party is
attempting to show a threatened injury, as opposed to an ac-
tual injury, that party must demonstrate that the injury is
"imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." 28
Likewise, the Supreme Court has made efforts to explain
the second element of the standing test, causation.29 The in-
jury must be caused by the defendant's conduct; it cannot be
the "result of the independent action of some third party not
before the court."30 In addition, the injury must not be atten-
uated.31 "ITihe indirectness of the injury . . .may make it
substantially more difficult to meet the minimum require-
ment of Art. III."32
The third requirement of standing is that the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. 33 The Court
has noted that this requirement serves several of the implicit
policies embodied in Article III. 34 "It tends to assure that the
legal questions presented to the court will be resolved.., in a
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation
of the consequence of judicial action."35 But more recently,
the significance of redressability has been called into ques-
tion. 36 The questions surrounding redressability are espe-
cially apparent when it is applied to a cause of action based
on environmental statutes, such as NEPA.37
27. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)).
28. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
29. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976).
30. Id.
31. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984).
32. Id. at 757-58 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).
33. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 38.
34. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
35. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
36. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 229. Professor Sunstein states that the
redressability inquiry should be "whether the injury that Congress sought to
prevent would likely be redressed by a favorable judgment. [We should]
characteriz[e] the injury in the way desired by Congress and then [see] if that
injury would be removed by a decree in the plaintiffs favor." Id. In other
words, Professor Sunstein suggests that where redressability is concerned, we
should remove the emphasis from the particular plaintiff before the court.
37. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/11
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B. The National Environmental Policy Act 38
Society first formally recognized "the relationship be-
tween the environment and the welfare of human beings ...
twenty-five years ago when Congress passed and President
Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)."39 Although the policy statement of NEPA sets lofty
substantive goals,4° it requires the government agencies to
act in an essentially procedural manner.4 1 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has directed the lower courts to follow the
procedural regulations of the law. 42
NEPA's primary procedural requirement is that all fed-
eral agencies must "include in every recommendation or re-
port on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on
the environmental impact of the proposed action."43 This de-
tailed statement is now commonly known as an environmen-
tal impact statement (EIS).44 The EIS has been the basis for
many lawsuits since the passage of NEPA, and standing for
such claims has often been the subject of litigation.45 Since
NEPA imposes only procedural requirements on governmen-
tal agencies, NEPA lawsuits typically challenge shortcomings
in EIS preparation procedures. 46 These challenges are
termed procedural rights lawsuits. 47
38. NEPA §§ 101-209, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1994).
39. Dinah Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act: Its Origins and
Evolutions, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1995) [hereinafter Bear].
40. See NEPA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331.
41. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
42. See Bear, supra note 39, at 5.
43. NEPA § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
44. See Bear, supra note 39, at 6.
45. See, e.g., Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995); Sab-
ine River Auth. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1992).
46. See id.
47. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
1997] 379
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C. Procedural Injury Under NEPA
1. Before Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Prior to Lujan, the Supreme Court had never mentioned
the term procedural injury.48 However, the Court had recog-
nized that Congress "may enact statutes creating legal rights,
the invasion of which create standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute."49 A violation of such legal
rights (such as a failure to prepare an EIS) results in a proce-
dural injury, and this injury satisfies the injury in fact re-
quirement of standing.50 The procedural injury does not,
however, replace the injury in fact requirement. Rather,
courts have generally required that, in addition to the proce-
dural injury, plaintiffs must demonstrate a geographical
nexus to the area that may be affected by the governmental
action. 51
The term geographical nexus was first used by a court
considering standing for a procedural injury in City of Davis
v. Coleman.52 In Davis, the court considered a case involving
the failure of a government body to prepare an EIS.5 3 The
court reviewed the district court's determination that plain-
tiffs lacked standing, and reversed the lower court, stating:
The procedural injury implicit in agency failure to prepare
an EIS . . . is itself a sufficient 'injury in fact' to support
standing, provided this injury is alleged by a plaintiff hav-
ing a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the chal-
lenged project that he may be expected to suffer whatever
environmental consequences the project may have.54
48. Search of WESTLAW, SCT Library (Sept. 26, 1997).
49. Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 n.3 (1973) (involving the dis-
criminatory application of a Texas criminal statute). See also Hardin v. Ken-
tucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) (involving a dispute as to whether the
Tennessee Valley Authority could properly make its electric power available in
a certain section of Tennessee).
50. See Brandon D. Smith, Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife: A Slash and
Burn Expedition Through the Law of Environmental Standing, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 859, 880 (1994).
51. See, e.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 666.
54. Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/11
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A purpose of defining injury in fact as a procedural injury
plus a geographical nexus was explained by the Davis court:
Were we to agree with the district court that a NEPA
plaintiffs standing depends on 'proof that the challenged
federal project will have particular environmental effects,
we would in essence be requiring that the plaintiff conduct
the same environmental investigation that he seeks in his
suit to compel the agency to undertake. Compliance with
NEPA is a primary duty of every federal agency; fulfill-
ment of this vital responsibility should not depend on the
vigilance and limited resources of environmental plaintiffs.
It is the federal agency, not environmental action groups or
local government, which is required by NEPA to produce
an EIS.5 5
A showing of a geographical nexus also meets the prudential
requirement that the injury must not be common to all mem-
bers of the public.56 In Davis, the court held that to suffer an
injury within the context of NEPA, a litigant must: (1) show
that the failure to prepare an EIS "creates a risk that serious
environmental impacts will be overlooked,"5 7 and (2) have a
"sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the challenged
project that he may be expected to suffer whatever environ-
mental consequences the project may have."5 8
Following its Davis opinion, the Ninth Circuit considered
a similar issue in Oregon Environmental Council v.
Kunzman.59 There, the plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the
55. Davis, 521 F.2d at 670-71 (footnote omitted). See also Bentsen H, 94
F.3d 658, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Buckley, J., concurring) ("the court now requires
that a litigant be able to establish the nature and likelihood of the environmen-
tal injury that it is the purpose of an environmental impact statement to
identify").
56. See United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 119-20 (1st Cir. 1992).
See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("when the asserted harm is
a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of
jurisdiction").
57. Davis, 521 F.2d at 670.
58. Id. at 671. This two-part test is what the court of appeals applied in
Bentsen 1, 54 F.3d 873, 877 (1995), and what the dissent relied on in Bentsen H,
94 F.3d at 674.
59. 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987).
19971
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Department of Agriculture from spraying for gypsy moths.60
The court held that the geographical nexus existed for the
plaintiffs' members because they resided "in a state with an
actual gypsy moth problem and thus may challenge a nation-
wide EIS that is applicable to them."61 The next year, the
same court held that plaintiffs' members who "live[d] within a
five-mile radius" of the proposed federal action demonstrated
a "sufficient geographical nexus," and therefore met the in-
jury element of standing.62 Finally, in 1992, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that because several of the plaintiff environmental
organization's members "[were] accustomed to visit[ing] and
enjoy[ing]" specific areas within the proposed affected area,
they satisfied the geographical nexus requirement. 63
Several other circuits have recognized the need for plain-
tiffs to demonstrate a geographical nexus as an element of a
procedural injury. In City of Evanston v. Regional Transpor-
tation Authority,64 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate standing under NEPA because they did
"not sufficiently allege where they live[d] in relation to the
property."65 The Fifth Circuit cited the Davis court's require-
ment of a geographical nexus in Sabine River Authority v.
United States Department of Interior,66 holding that the
plaintiffs had demonstrated standing to challenge the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service's failure to comply with
60. See id. at 489.
61. Id. at 491.
62. Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Carlucci, Nos. 86-6428, 86-6679, 1988
WL 63741, at *1 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service's failure to prepare an EIS). See also Friends of the Earth v. United
States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1988).
63. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma (Mumma), 956 F.2d 1508, 1517
(9th Cir. 1992). This decision was handed down one month before Lujan. See
id. at 1508; Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). It should be noted that the injury
claimed in Mumma was substantially similar to the injury in Bentsen, namely,
that the plaintiffs' use of the natural areas would be adversely affected by the
government action. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1517 (9th Cir. 1992).
64. 825 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1987).
65. Id. at 1126. See also South E. Lake View Neighbors v. Department of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 685 F.2d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing City of
Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975)).
66. 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1992).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/11
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NEPA.67 In City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration,68 the D.C. Circuit also adopted the ge-
ographical nexus requirement. 69 In United States v. AVX
Corp. ,70 the First Circuit held that the plaintiff
bore [the] burden, to the extent its standing was dependent
on a claim of procedural harm, to [describe] with fair speci-
ficity some concrete nexus between its members and the
harbor area. Without such a nexus, any procedural harm
its members suffered was common to all members of the
public and, therefore, did not rise to the level of stating an
individualized claim of harm. 71
Thus, several circuits have recognized the importance of the
geographical nexus requirement first described in Davis. In
1992, the Supreme Court, too, recognized this importance
throughout the Court's opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.72
2. Procedural Injury Standing According to Lujan
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Supreme Court in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife73 sparked much debate and discus-
sion, 74 and has been described as a "dramatic opinion ...
which significantly shifts the law of standing."75 Lujan in-
volved a challenge to the Secretary of the Interior's promulga-
tion of a rule interpreting the Endangered Species Act of
67. Id. at 674.
68. 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
69. Id. at 492-93.
70. 962 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1992).
71. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
72. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 17; Christopher T. Burt, Procedural In-
jury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 275
(1995); Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. LAN USE & ENvTL. L. 75 (1995); Brandon D. Smith,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: A Slash-And-Burn Expedition through the Law
of Environmental Standing, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 859 (1994); Patti A. Meeks, Jus-
tice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8:2 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 343 (1993).
75. Sunstein, supra note 17, at 164-65.
1997] 383
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1973.76 Although Lujan is not a case based on a procedural
injury,77 the Supreme Court discussed standing for such a
case.
78
Three areas of the Lujan decision are helpful in deter-
mining the Court's view of procedural injury standing re-
quirements: (1) the discussion of the "irreducible
constitutional minimum[s]" 79 of standing; (2) the discussion
of procedural rights cases and the reduced standards for
meeting the redressability and immediacy (an element of in-
jury); 0 and (3) the geographical nexus requirement.81
a. The Irreducible Minimums
The Lujan Court stated the traditional requirements of
standing,8 2 but expanded the definitions of some of those re-
quirements. The first element of standing discussed by the
Court was injury in fact.8 3 The Court declared an injury in
fact to be "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or immi-
nent, not conjectural or hypothetical."8 4 The second require-
ment for standing discussed by the Court was causation.85
The Court defined causation as "a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-58.
77. Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote:
This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a proce-
dural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate
concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural requirement for a
hearing prior to denial of their license application, or the proce-
dural requirement for an environmental impact statement before a
federal facility is constructed next door to them).
Id. at 572.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 560.
80. See id. at 573 n.7. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia acknowl-
edges reduced standards for the "irreducible constitutional minimums." Id.
81. See id. at 555-56.
82. Id. at 560.
83. See id.
84. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
85. See id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/11
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and not the result of the independent action of some third
party not before the court."8 6 The third requirement dis-
cussed was that "it must be likely as opposed to merely specu-
lative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision."8 7
b. The Court's Discussion of Procedural Rights
Cases
Justice Scalia distinguished the case before the Court
from one brought under NEPA for failing to prepare an EIS.8 8
In footnote seven, Justice Scalia described the special excep-
tion for procedural rights cases:
There is this much truth to the assertion that 'procedural
rights' are special: The person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert
that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law,
one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of
a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the li-
censing agency's failure to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement, even though he cannot establish with any
certainty that the statement will cause the license to be
withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be
completed for many years.8 9
c. Geographical Nexus
At the end of the hypothetical situation in footnote seven,
Justice Scalia distinguished the respondent's argument from
the person living adjacent to the dam. 90 Justice Scalia wrote
that the respondent's argument sought "standing for persons
who have no concrete interests affected [analogous to] per-
sons who live . . . at the other end of the country from the
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Si-
mon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
87. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Simon, 426 U.S.
at 38, 43).
88. See id. at 572.
89. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.7.
90. See id.
19971
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dam."91 Thus, Justice Scalia indicated that proximity to the
dam is important. Justice Scalia focused on the geographical
nexus requirement again when he wrote: "It is even plausi-
ble ... to think that a person who observes or works with
animals of a particular species in the very area of the world
where that species is threatened by a federal decision is fac-
ing [perceptible] harm."92 Finally, in footnote three, Justice
Scalia wrote that the "geographical remoteness" of the re-
spondent's members from [the place of the governmental ac-
tion] necessarily prevented a finding "that concrete injury to
their members was... certainly impending."93 Although the
Court did not use the term, it recognized that a showing of a
geographical nexus creates a concrete interest. 94 Therefore,
such a showing would satisfy the standing requirement of in-
jury in fact. 95 This recognition by the Supreme Court estab-
lished that the geographical nexus requirement is an
important element of the standing doctrine for procedural
rights cases.
3. Interpretations of Lujan by the Circuit Courts of
Appeals
The Ninth Circuit has continued to emphasize the impor-
tance of a geographical nexus as part of the injury in fact re-
quirement of procedural rights standing. 96 In Douglas
County v. Babbit,9 7 the court interpreted Lujan to require
"two essential elements for procedural standing: (1) that he
or she is a person who has been accorded a procedural right
to protect his or her concrete interests . . .and (2) that the
plaintiff has some threatened concrete interest.., that is the
ultimate basis of his or her standing."98 In footnote five of
91. Id.
92. Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 567 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. See id. at 565-66.
95. See id.
96. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text for Ninth Circuit cases
prior to Lujan which require a geographical nexus.
97. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
98. Id. at 1500 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 573 nn.7-8).
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that opinion, the Douglas County court noted: "The district
court was correct to equate the geographic nexus test of past
Ninth Circuit cases with the concrete interest test of Lu-
jan."99 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit recognized the Supreme
Court's declaration that, in an action brought for failure to
prepare an EIS, the party invoking the court's authority must
demonstrate a geographical nexus to the area that will be af-
fected by the governmental action.100
The D.C. Circuit also continued to apply the geographical
nexus test to procedural rights plaintiffs after Lujan.1° 1 In
Bentsen 1,102 the court found that the plaintiff had estab-
lished standing. 10 3 The court relied on Lujan to support the
geographical nexus aspect of standing.'0 4 However, that de-
cision was reversed in a rehearing in banc.10 5 The result of
the rehearing in banc, Bentsen 11, serves as the basis for this
Case Note.
III. Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen
A. Facts and Procedural History
The United States Code allows a tax credit for producers
of fuels containing alcohol.10 6 Somewhat simplified, the stat-
ute allows for a tax credit of sixty cents for every gallon used
or produced (or both) by the taxpayer. 10 7 Certain mixtures of
gasoline contain ethanol which is an alcohol.' 08 The tax
99. Id. at 1501 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 573 n.8). See also Didrickson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 982
F.2d 1332, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that declarants meet the geographical
nexus test because, "unlike the declarants in [Lujan, the declarants here are]
concerned with action harming sea otters in Alaska, where the declarants live
and in particular areas that they frequent").
100. See Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1501 n.5.
101. See Bentsen I, 54 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 880.
104. See id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-64).
105. See Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 672.
106. See 26 U.S.C. § 40(a) (Supp. 1996).
107. See id. § 40(b)(1)(A)-(2)(A) (1986 & Supp. 1996).
108. See id. § 40(d)(1)(A).
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credit applies to these ethanol mixtures as well as to mix-
tures containing methanol. 10 9
In March of 1990, the Secretary of the Treasury, Lloyd
M. Bentsen, expanded this credit by allowing it to apply to
ethanol used in the production of ethyl tertiary butyl ether
(ETBE).110 ETBE is a chemical compound that is "blended
with gasoline as an octane enhancer." ' As a finished prod-
uct, ETBE does not contain ethanol or methanol; therefore,
the tax credit did not apply to ETBE prior to the Secretary's
action. 1 2
Some commentators suggested that NEPA required the
Internal Revenue Service to prepare an EIS before expanding
the tax credit. 113 But the IRS disagreed, believing that the
expansion fell within a clause in Treasury Directive 75-02,
which contains the Treasury procedures for issuing an
EIS. 1 4 That clause states:
Bureau actions which are categorically excluded [from re-
quiring environmental impact statements] include... In-
ternal Revenue Service functions in the administration of
the Internal Revenue Code, such as regulations interpret-
ing, implementing, or clarifying code provisions .... 115
The Secretary determined that the tax credit expansion was
a form of "interpreting, implementing, or clarifying" 1 6 the
Code, and was therefore excluded from requiring an EIS." 7
The appellants in Bentsen I (Diane Jensen, the Florida Audu-
109. See id.
110. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8946 (1990).
111. Id.
112. See id. However, ethanol is one of the substances used in the produc-
tion of ETBE. See id.
113. See id. at 8947.
114. See id.
115. 45 Fed. Reg. 1828, 1830 (1980). Certain regulations implementing
NEPA allow government agencies to take some actions which are exempt from
EIS preparation. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1997). It was on the basis of these
NEPA regulations that the Secretary issued Treasury Directive 75-02, within
which he defined the actions which are exempt from NEPA's requirements. See
55 Fed. Reg. at 8947.
116. 45 Fed. Reg. at 1830.
117. See id. at 8947.
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bon Society, the Florida Wildlife Federation, and the Friends
of the Earth) challenged the tax credit expansion by filing a
claim against the Secretary and Margaret Richardson, the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. 118 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the tax credit would increase the production
of ethanol, and because ethanol is derived from corn, sugar
cane, and sugar beets, the production of those crops would
also increase. 1 9 An increase in crop production would cause
certain environmental effects on land that the plaintiffs
used, 120 and would affect the plaintiffs' drinking water. 12
The District Court for the District of Columbia found
that the plaintiffs lacked standing and granted summary
judgment in favor of the Secretary. 22 In a 2-1 decision, the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the appellants had
met the two-part test for procedural standing because (1) the
appellants demonstrated that there was a risk of overlooking
serious environmental harm, and (2) the appellants demon-
strated a sufficient geographical nexus. 23 A majority of
eleven judges on the court of appeals voted in favor of the
appellee's suggestion for a rehearing in banc.' 24
The court in banc affirmed the district court's decision
that the appellants failed to demonstrate standing. 25 Six
judges joined to form the majority, one judge concurred in the
118. See Bentsen 1, 54 F.3d 873, 875 (1995).
119. See Bentsen H, 94 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In a sworn statement,
Ms. Jensen stated that farmers (near the natural areas she uses), who receive
state subsidies to leave some land fallow, will develop that land in order to re-
ceive the tax credit. Id. at 677 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
120. See Bentsen H, 94 F.3d at 662. The plaintiffs used natural areas which
adjoined the farmland. See id.
121. See id. at 677-78 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Plaintiff Diane Jensen intro-
duced evidence that the pesticide atrazine is used to treat crops (83% of which
are corn crops) in order to increase the yield of those crops. See id. at 678. She
showed through further evidence that the ETBE tax credit would cause a rise in
the use of atrazine. See id. Finally, Ms. Jensen introduced evidence that
atrazine (which the EPA has classified as a possible human carcinogen) is found
in 58% of tap water in the area in which she lives. See id.
122. See id. at 662.
123. See Bentsen I, 64 F.3d at 880.
124. See Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 64 F.3d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
125. See Bentsen H, 94 F.3d at 672.
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result only, and four judges dissented.126 Since Judge Buck-
ley (in his concurrence) agreed with the dissent that the court
should not have adopted a new standing test,127 the court ac-
tually split 6-5 in favor of a new standing test.128
B. Holding and Reasoning of the Majority
The majority held that the appellants failed to demon-
strate standing on two bases: (1) the appellants did not es-
tablish that they had "suffered or will suffer an injury to their
particularized interest," and (2) appellants did not demon-
strate that "it [was] substantially probable that the promul-
gation of the tax credit would cause any such injury."129
The court stated that the standing requirements for pro-
cedural rights plaintiffs are as follows: (1) a particularized
injury; (2) the injury must be demonstrable; (3) the injury
must be fairly traceable to the act of the agency; and (4) the
act must be substantially probable to cause the injury. 130
First, the court inquired into whether the plaintiffs had
demonstrated an injury. 131 Without the support of precedent,
the court drew a distinction between a governmental action
at a particular location and an action in the form of broad
rulemaking, such as the Secretary's expansion of the tax
credit.132 The court declared that the standard for a plaintiff
alleging an injury from broad rulemaking is stricter than that
of a plaintiff challenging an action at a particular location. 133
The court stated that the test of injury in fact requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate that a particularized interest of
the plaintiff was injured, and that "everyone else" would not
be injured so as to make the injury too general for court ac-
126. See id. at 661.
127. See id. at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring).
128. See infra Part IV.
129. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 672.
130. See id. at 666.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 667.
133. See id.
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tion.' 34 In a footnote, the court discussed the requirement of
a geographical nexus:
As the 'geographical nexus' test at issue here was in fact
intended to ensure that a plaintiffs injury met this first
criterion of being particularized and personal, an analysis
of that test that does not actually require the plaintiff to
demonstrate that.., particularity must be invalid. 135
In other words, the court interpreted the geographical nexus
requirement to include a sub-requirement that the injury to
the plaintiffs interest be demonstrable.136 Thus, for injury in
fact, the court required the following: (1) a procedural viola-
tion; and (2) a showing of a geographical nexus, which the
court defined as (a) an injury that "everyone else" does not
suffer (shown through plaintiffs usage of land near the land
affected by the action) and (b) a demonstration of the injury
caused by the governmental act.' 37 The court concluded that
the appellants did not provide competent evidence that farm-
ers (with land adjacent to the land used by appellants) would
increase their crop production as a result of the tax credit.138
Therefore, the court held that the appellants did not demon-
strate an injury to their interest, thus failing to meet the new
element of the injury in fact test of standing. 39
C. Concurring Opinion
As noted above, Judge Buckley concurred in the result,
but not in the reasoning of the majority. After declaring that
the court's opinion "imposes an unduly heavy burden on ap-
134. See id. at 667 n.4.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. In footnote four, the majority requires that the plaintiffs "demonstrate
that ...particularity." Id. This language masks what the court is actually
requiring. Later in the text of the opinion, the majority states "Appellants...
have not demonstrated that individual corn or sugar farmers in these areas will
affirmatively respond to the tax credit by significantly increasing production."
Id. at 667. Thus, the court requires the appellants to demonstrate the injury,
not just the particularity.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 668.
139. See id.
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pellants,"140 Judge Buckley stated that the court's opinion re-
quired the plaintiffs to establish elements that would
normally be developed through an EIS. 141 However, he
stated that the appellants failed to meet the nexus require-
ment of procedural rights standing, and thus he concurred in
the result. 142 Judge Buckley concluded that "the court has
adopted new criteria for the establishment of standing in
NEPA cases that will erode the effectiveness of one of the
most important environmental measures of the past
generation." 143
D. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Rogers authored the dissenting opinion, and was
joined by three other judges.14 4 Judge Rogers concluded that
the D.C. Circuit's prior two-part standing test for plaintiffs
alleging a procedural rights violation under NEPA should
have been applied.' 45 She also noted Justice Scalia's state-
ment in Lujan that procedural rights cases are special. 46
Judge Rogers stated that it is "inherently speculative" 147 as
to how the agency would react to an EIS, adding that the ma-
jority's test essentially requires appellants to prepare an
EIS.148
In considering whether the appellants met the require-
ment of injury in fact, Judge Rogers concluded they had done
so, reasoning that the appellants produced "voluminous evi-
dence" that demonstrated a concrete and particularized in-
jury.14 9 Judge Rogers argued that the majority's finding that
the appellants had not demonstrated an injury in fact was
140. Id. at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. Chief Judge Edwards, Judge Wald, and Judge Tatel joined in
the dissenting opinion. Id.
145. See id. at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting). The two-part test is explained in
note 58, supra, and accompanying text.
146. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
147. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 675.
149. Id. at 677.
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based on the imminence of that injury. 150 She pointed to Jus-
tice Scalia's statement in Lujan that a plaintiff in a proce-
dural rights case is not required to meet the normal standard
of immediacy. 15 ' Judge Rogers concluded that the evidence
presented by the appellants established "a greater likelihood
of a localized impact where Ms. Jensen lives,"15 2 and there-
fore the appellants demonstrated injury in fact.
IV. Analysis of the Majority Opinion
A. The Elements of Standing
The majority discussed what is required by each element
of the standing doctrine.' 53 In doing so, the majority misin-
terpreted the guidance of Lujan on numerous occasions.
1. Injury in Fact
Most significantly, the court used Lujan improperly to
support its adoption of a new standard for injury in fact. The
court stated that plaintiffs' particularized injuries must be
demonstrable, 5 4 a requirement that it claimed Lujan sup-
ports. 155 However, nowhere in that section of the Lujan opin-
ion does the Supreme Court use the word "demonstrable," nor
does it articulate a standard even vaguely similar. 56 Instead
of simply adopting the Supreme Court's standard for injury
in fact,' 57 the court, relying on a 1975 case that did not deal
with procedural rights standing,158 changed the well-estab-
150. See id. at 678 (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
151. See id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).
152. Id. at 679.
153. See id. at 664-67.
154. See supra notes 130 and accompanying text for the Bentsen II court's
precise holding.
155. See Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 666 (claiming that the Lujan court required
injuries to be demonstrable).
156. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
157. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
158. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (involving a claim that a zon-
ing ordinance violated civil rights statutes and the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights).
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lished geographical nexus test by adding the requirement
that the injury must be demonstrable.
The Bentsen court also discussed the issue of imminence,
a sub-requirement of showing injury in fact. 159 In its discus-
sion the court relied on Lujan, and stated:
the primary focus of the standing inquiry is not the immi-
nence . . . of the injury to the plaintiff, but whether the
plaintiff who has suffered [a] personal and particularized
injury has sued a defendant who has caused that injury. 160
However, that is not an accurate characterization of
what Justice Scalia wrote in footnote seven. Justice Scalia
declared that the normal standard for imminence need not be
met.161 Stating that imminence is not the primary focus is
much different than stating that the normal standard for im-
minence need not be met. Additionally, the court treated the
immediacy inquiry as an element of causation, not as an ele-
ment of injury in fact.' 62 Thus, by not acknowledging a re-
duced standard for immediacy, the Bentsen II court allocated
too much weight to this element in holding that the appel-
lants did not demonstrate standing. Indeed, this is precisely
what Judge Rogers discussed in her dissent.16 3
159. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
155 (1990)) (stating that an injury must be imminent, not conjectural). The
word "imminent" is defined as "likely to happen without delay." WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 702 (2d College ed. 1982). It should be noted that the
D.C. Circuit has held: "the likelihood of injury, whether or not that likelihood
depends upon a single event or a chain of events, is properly a concern of the
personal injury inquiry, not the causation inquiry .... " Wilderness Soc'y v.
Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As noted above, the injury claimed by
the appellants in Bentsen is one that would occur through a chain of events.
The likelihood (imminence) of that injury is therefore not a question of causa-
tion. Rather, it is an element of the injury in fact inquiry, and its importance
should be de-emphasized according to Lujan. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.7. How-
ever, the Bentsen court concluded that plaintiffs did not support "each step of
their attenuated causal path." Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 671 (emphasis added).
The court should have considered the likelihood of the chain of events as a de-
emphasized element of injury in fact, not as an element of causation.
160. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 664 (emphasis added).
161. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.7 (emphasis added).
162. See supra note 155.
163. See Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 678 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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2. Redressability
The court also stated that in footnote seven of Lujan, the
Supreme Court "expressly declined to examine whether
proper execution of the omitted [federal] procedure will likely
prompt a modification of the government's action."164 Again,
the court has misstated the content of footnote seven. The
Supreme Court did examine this issue, and determined that
redressability is an issue that demands less than the normal
requirements. 165 The relevant portion of footnote seven
states:
Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for
proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has
standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement, even though he
cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will
cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though
the dam will not be completed for many years. 166
However, by not acknowledging a reduced standard for
redressability, the Bentsen II court allocated too much weight
to this element in holding that the appellants did not demon-
strate standing.
3. Causation
The Bentsen If court adopted a new standard for causa-
tion.167 Even though the Lujan Court described the causa-
tion inquiry in detail, 68 the Bentsen II court did not adopt
the language of Lujan. Rather, the majority adopted a signif-
icantly stricter standard: the action must be "substantially
164. Id. at 664.
165. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.7.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 669.
168. Lujan requires "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party
not before the court." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976)).
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likely to cause [a] demonstrable increase in risk to [the plain-
tiffs'] particularized interest."169
In creating this stricter standard, the court cited an opin-
ion by the Ninth Circuit.170 However, the standard in the
Ninth Circuit opinion is significantly different than that of
Bentsen I. Thus, the court's reliance on that standard is im-
proper. In the footnote cited by the Bentsen II court, the
Ninth Circuit made its standard very clear: "we suggested
that causation need only be established with reasonable
probability. We think that it is reasonably probable that the
designation of the critical habitat would affect adjoining
lands." 71 The standard of reasonably probable is signifi-
cantly less demanding than the standard of substantially
likely. Therefore, the Bentsen II court mischaracterized the
Ninth Circuit's standard.
In support of the stricter standard, the court also cited
Kurtz v. Baker,172 a 1987 D.C. Circuit case.' 73 Kurtz involved
a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment that "the exclusion
of 'non-theists' from the 'guest speaker program' in the Sen-
ate and the House" violated the First and Fifth Amend-
ments. 174 The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove
that without his exclusion, there was "a 'substantial
probability' he would have been able to address" one of the
houses of Congress. 175 In other words, the plaintiff failed to
prove that "had the court granted the relief he sought, there
would have been at least a substantial probability" 76 he
would have been able to address Congress. However, this use
of substantial probability is part of the redressability inquiry,
169. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 665.
170. The court cites Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
See supra note 100 and accompanying text for an explanation of Douglas
County.
171. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1501 n.6 (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
172. 829 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
173. See Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 666.
174. Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1136.
175. Id.
176. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264 (1977).
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not the causation inquiry. Therefore, the court applied an
unduly strict standard for the appellants to show causation.
B. The Practical Effect of the New Standing Requirements
In her dissent, Judge Rogers stated that one of the effects
of the court's analysis and conclusion is that "it will be virtu-
ally impossible to bring a NEPA challenge to rulemakings
with diffuse impacts."177 The majority responded to this as-
sertion by admitting that such a plaintiff "may have some dif-
ficulty meeting this standard, but that difficulty stems from
the nature of the plaintiffs claim, which is premised on an
alleged injury that is itself difficult to locate . ... ",178 The
question the court's response creates is whether, in light of
the statutory language of NEPA, the difficulty encountered
by such a plaintiff is a desired result. Of course, it would not
be proper for the court to form its legal analysis around the
result it desires. However, NEPA requires an EIS for all ma-
jor federal actions which significantly affect the environ-
ment.' 79 Certainly, rulemaking may be a major federal
action,' 80 and that action can have enormous environmental
impacts.' 8 1 The result of the Bentsen decision is that such
actions can go forward unchecked.
Judge Buckley, in his concurrence, and Judge Rogers, in
her dissent, both asserted that the court's decision requires
the plaintiffs to prepare the EIS themselves in order to have
standing. 8 2 If an EIS were prepared, it would likely attempt
to determine to what extent the Secretary's action would
cause an increase in the use of atrazine,18 3 and an increase in
177. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 675 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 665.
179. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1994).
180. See, e.g., 50 Feg. Reg. 25,473 (1985) (Office of Surface Mining Reclama-
tion and Enforcement determined that proposed rule defining prohibitions for
coal mining operations was a major Federal action within the meaning of
NEPA, and therefore required the preparation of an EIS).
181. See id.
182. See Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring), 675 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir.
1975)).
183. See supra note 121.
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the production of corn, sugar cane, and sugar beets.18 4 The
EIS would also determine what impact those increases would
have on the environment. Thus, by requiring the plaintiffs to
"demonstrate"18 5 "that individual corn or sugar farmers ...
will affirmatively respond to the tax credit by significantly in-
creasing production,"18 6 the court is essentially requiring the
plaintiffs to prepare an EIS. However, "[tio require plaintiffs
to show what [the environmental] effects [of a proposed fed-
eral action] are, as a prerequisite to requiring that an EIS be
performed, seems inconsistent with the basic purpose of
NEPA."l87
Therefore, absent preparing an EIS, plaintiffs challeng-
ing a rulemaking with diffuse impacts are unable to maintain
standing. In light of the statutory language in NEPA, this is
an undesirable result. The Bentsen court has taken the re-
cent trend 88 adopted by courts interpreting the standing doc-
trine more strictly to an unacceptable extreme.
V. Conclusion
The doctrine of standing as applied to procedural rights
plaintiffs bringing an action under NEPA has been carefully
developed by the courts over the last two decades. 8 9 Circuit
courts have long expressed the need for these plaintiffs to es-
tablish a geographical nexus to the affected area.190 Finally,
in 1992, the Supreme Court in Lujan also recognized the
need for such a requirement.' 9 ' The Lujan court provided
guidance for courts faced with plaintiffs alleging a failure to
prepare an EIS. 192
The Bentsen II court was faced with such a claim, but
misapplied Lujan in its analysis of all three requirements of
184. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
186. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d at 667.
187. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 1107 (2d ed. 1985).
188. See infra note 3 and accompanying text.
189. See infra Part II.C.
190. See id.
191. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
192. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
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standing. The court did not acknowledge the Supreme
Court's clear instructions in Lujan that the normal require-
ments of redressability and immediacy need not be met by
procedural rights plaintiffs. The Bentsen II court adopted a
stricter standard for causation than was expressed in Lujan.
Finally, and most importantly, the Bentsen If court created a
new element of injury in fact by requiring the injury to be
demonstrable. This final blow to procedural rights plaintiffs
not only ignores Lujan's support for the geographical nexus
test, but also "erodes the effectiveness of one of the most im-
portant environmental measures of the past generation."193
193. Bentsen 11, 94 F.3d 658, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Buckley, J., concurring).
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